Braking Bad? Reflections on the German Government’s Misuse of Special Funds for Infrastructure and Climate Investments and its Legal Consequences
In March 2026, it was reported that the German government had used a special fund, constitutionally earmarked for investments into infrastructure and climate neutrality, almost entirely for other purposes. In her blog for Human Rights Here, Tessa Trapp argues that this ‘misuse’ is not only politically controversial: it may also require legal correction of the misallocated spending as well as subsequent use of the available funds for their constitutionally prescribed purpose.
Abstract
In March 2026, German economic institutes found that the German government had used a special fund, constitutionally earmarked for investments into infrastructure and climate neutrality, almost entirely for other purposes. This ‘misuse’ is not only politically controversial: I argue that human rights obligations, as interpreted by the German Constitutional Court (‘BVerfG’) and regional and international jurisprudence, might require not only legal correction of misallocated spending, but also the subsequent investment of the available funds into climate protection.
The special fund was created as an exception to the German Schuldenbremse, a constitutionally anchored debt brake. The Schuldenbremse limits the amount of additional borrowing by federal and state governments. Economically liberal parties such as the FDP and the CDU/CSU argue that this system promotes intergenerational equity, security, and trust. However, it remains criticised because of the restricted flexibility in responding to economic and societal needs (as evident during the COVID-19 pandemic). Critics, including the Left party and the German Trade Union Confederation, also argue that it slows public investment and social policy, and forces public spending cuts. Even from a purely economic perspective, the system has been criticised to limit growth. Consequently, there have been many calls to do away with the system.
